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I.  Introduction 
The  emergence of  organized  markets  for  low-rated  corporate  (or  junk) 
bonds  has  provided  financial  researchers  with  an  opportunity  to  address  a 
fundamental question:  are holders of  default-prone debt compensated (actuar- 
ially) for the risk of  default? Past research on  this market has focused on  the 
default  experience of  corporate debt.  A  quite different area of  research  in- 
volves  modeling  the spreads between the returns of  bonds of  different credit 
quality.  Few  (if  any)  research  efforts have combined  these  approaches  by 
using  past default  experience  to explain  differential rates of  return on  low- 
. 
rated bonds. 
In  this study we develop a  risk-neutral model of  the expected probability 
of  default  for  low-grade  bonds as a  function of  the additional  required  rate 
of  return  on  these  instruments  over  default-free bonds.  Within  this  frame- 
work, securities are priced as functions of  the first moment of  the return dis- 
tribution.  The techniques are used to express this pricing relationship in  terms 
of  the yields  to maturity  of  risky  bonds as  well  as  their holding  period  re- 
turns.  We then compare the default  rates implied  in corporate bond  yields to 
a  series  based  on  recent corporate  bond  default experience.  We  also discuss 
why  implied  default  rates cannot  be obtained from  measured  holding  period 
returns.  Finally,  attention  is  paid  to macroeconomic  indicators of  expected 
default rates. 
In  an early paper on the subject of  default risk premia, Fisher (1959) sug- 
gested  that the risk  premium  required on a  corporate bond  (holding  maturity 
constant) depends on the likelihood  that the issuing firm will default (defined 
here as a  failure to pay  any coupon  or principal payments when  due)  and on 
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the influence on required  returns that result from call provisions,  the tax ef- 
fect  for deep discount  bonds (due  to the different tax treatment  of  ord~nary 
Income  vs.  capital gains),  and sinking fund payments (which  reduce the aver- 
age maturlty of  a  firm's  debt).  Isolating the influence of  default likelihood on 
interest-rate differentials involves controlling for these other effects. 
As  Jones,  Mason  and Rosenfeld (1984)  pointed  out,  studies that attempt 
to explain corporate bond  prices can be identified 3s  being either "macro
N  in 
nature,  in  that relative bond  prices are modeled  as  being "functions of  the 
supply  and  demand  of  various assets,  and/or  the position of  the economy  in 
the business cycle," or as  being "microw in that relative prices are modeled .as 
a  function of  firm specific characteristics.  The approach  taken in  this paper 
is macro;  that is,  that aggregate returns on a  sample of  bonds are used  to 
infer  average default  probabilities  for  the population  of  bonds  with  similar 
characteristics. 
In  order to test  hypotheses concerning the models derived in this paper, 
we assume that bond  market participants are in complete agreement as to the 
probability of  default for a particular issue.  We  further assume that all bonds 
are perceived, and therefore priced, as  having  the same likelihood of  default 
as others in  the same rating category.  Ideally,  the assigned rating gives,  in a 
single  measure,  the rating agency's  estimate of  the issue's  probability of  de- 
fault. 
Studies  that  have  attempted  to  measure  the  importance  of  rating 
changes on  bond price movements  tend to differ in their conclusions.  Hetten- 
house  and  Satoris (1976) as  well  as  Weinstein  (1977)  conclude  that market 
participants  incorporate  new  information  before  a  rerating.  On  the other 
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to rating changes in  addition to  publicly  available information.  They also con- 
clude that ratings by  Moody's  and Standard &  Poor's are equally  reliable indi- 
cators of  an issue's creditworthiness. 
In  order  to  isolate  expected  default  probabilities,  we  will  restrict  our 
attention  to  two  broad  classes of  ratings:  investment  grade and  speculative 
grade.  Investment  grade  corporate  bonds  carry  a  rating  of  Baa3 or  higher 
(from Moody's)  and/or  BBB- or higher  (from Standard &  Poor's),  while  specu- 
lative grade bonds consist  of  issues with  ratings below  these,  as well as cor- 
porate bonds that are nonrated. 
Section  I1  contains a  discussion  of  the construction  of  the default  rate 
series used  in  this  paper.  In  section  111  we present a  model of  the pricing  of- 
default-prone bonds in  terms of  their required y~elds  to maturity and compare 
derived  implied  default  rates with  actual default  experience.  Section  IV  re- 
peats this exercise for holding  period  returns and discusses the complications 
of  using  holding  period  returns.  Section  V  investigates  the relationship  be- 
tween changes in  expected corporate default rates and certain macroeconomic 
measures.  In  section VI  we present a  summary  of  the paper and some closing 
remarks. 
11.  Measuring Corporate Defaults 
Economists  have  tracked  the performance  of  corporate debt  beginning 
with a  study  by  W.B.  Hickman  (1958).  His  and almost every subsequent  study 
defines the rate of  default as  the value of  issues defaulting during the period 
examined  divided  by  the value of  bonds  outstanding during some part of  the  - - 
per~od  (usually  the beginning).  Altman  and  Nammacher  (1985)  (A&N  hereafter) 
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the low-rated  sector,  the appropriate  measure  of  the corporate  default rate 
includes only  the value of  low-rated bonds in  the denominator. 
In  A&N,  and  in  this study,  only  publicly  held,  straight  (non-convertible) 
corporate debt with  a  speculative (or  no)  rating is included  in  the denomina- 
tor.  Convertible bond  defaults were included  in  the numerator for our  meas- 
urements,  however,  because of  the likelihood  that market participants  do not 
differentiate  between  losses  in  this sector and  the straight  bond  sector.  In 
the  six-year  period  from  the beginning  of  1980  through  1985,  a  total  of 
$3.586  billion  of  corporate  debt  defaulted,  roughly  $1.021  billion  of  which 
consisted of  convertible issues.  Eliminating these defaults would  substantially 
reduce our  measured  default rates.  The actual default  rate series presented 
below is therefore biased upwards. 
r 
A  complication  arises  in  the construction  of  a  measure  of  the default 
rate for bonds of  a  given rating:  by  the time an issue defaults,  it has usually 
descended in  rating until it has reached the rating D (for Default).  We,  there- 
fore,  limit  our  analysis  to the performance of  all low-rated corporate debt. 
Figure 1  presents a  monthly  time series plot  of  annualized  default  rates for 
January  1980  through  December  1985.  This  was constructed  by  dividing  the 
par value of  bonds defaulting at  each month  by  the par  value of  outstanding 
low-rated bonds at each date.  The par value of  defaulting issues was obtained 
from A&N (up to  December  1984) and Standard &  Poor's  Bond  Guide (through 
December  1985).  Observations on  the par  value  of  speculative  grade  bonds 
outstanding were taken at  the end of  each year from Standard & Poor's  Bond 
Guide.  Estimates of  outstanding bonds,  by  month,  were obtained by interpolat- 
ing annual measures.  The mean of  this default series is 1.883  percent,  with a 
4 
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several  points,  including  part of  1981,  and  attains a  maximum  of  19.504  per- 
cent in  April 1982. 
For  some  of  the analysis,  a  smoothed  default rate  series  is  employed, 
partly  because of  the volatile nature of  actual default rates.  A  smoothed  ver- 
sion  was constructed  by  summing  at  each  date  defaults  occurring over  the 
past  12  months  and  dividing  by  outstanding  low-rated  bonds  six  months 
earlier.  This is essentially  a  12-month  moving  average of  the monthly  default 
rate series.  From  January 1980 through  December  1985,  the average value of 
our  smoothed  default rate  series  is 1.796  percent,  roughly  corresponding  to 
A&N1s  estimate  of  1.507  percent  (obtained  from  year-end  observations  for 
January 1978 through  December  1984).  Our smoothed  default rate series has a 
standard  deviation  of  1.273  percent.  The  maximum  value  of  4.756  percent 
occurs in  November  1982,  while the minimum of  0.045  percent occurs in Octo- 
ber  1981.  A  summary  of  these series,  and all  subsequent  data series,  can be 
found in  table I. 
We note that  the constructed  series are based  on  the assumption  that 
defaults result in  a  total loss to bondholders.  In  fact,  AhN find  that default- 
ing  bonds continue to  trade at  41 percent of  par  within  one month  following 
the default.  Therefore,  the actual ttloss rate
t1  is somewhat lower than our de- 
fault rate estimates. 
111.  Default Rates and Yields to Maturity 
Our  theoretical  model  is  based  on  the pioneering  work  of  Bierman  and 
Hass (1975),  with subsequent extensions by  Yawitz (1977).  The proposed  model 
is in  the same  spirit as  that used  by  Yawitz,  Maloney,and  Ederington  (1983) 
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default probabilities and  tax effects. 1 
Most  asset-pricing models  are  based  upon  the  first and  second moments 
of  the  return distribution.  With  risk-neutral preferences,  on  the  other  hand, 
agents  consider  only  the  first moments  of  the distributions of  return:  the  se- 
curity's  expected  return completely  determines  its market  price.  This  frame- 
work  facilitates the  construction  of -a certainty-equivalence pricing relation- 
ship. 
Assume  that a promised coupon  (or  principal) payment  will be  rendered 
at  the end  of  a given  period with a perceived probability P.  A  payment pro- 
t  mised  t periods  from now  is expected  to be  received with probability  P . A 
default  occurs  (and  applies  only  to  payment  streams  for  which  there  have- 
been no previous defaults) with probability (1-PI.  In the event of  a default,  a 
fraction of  the promised  coupon  and  principal payments is received,  denoted 
here by  p. 
If capital markets are  frictionless,  and information is costless,  arbitrage 
will force  the market  price  of  a  certainty-equivalent  (default-risk-adjusted) 
payment  stream,  discounted  at  the  riskless rate of  interest to be  equal  to a 
risky  stream,  discounted  at  the appropriate risky rate of interest.  Algebraic- 
ally: 
where i  is the  riskless rate of  interest,  r is the risky  rate of  interest,  C is 
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Using  a  geometric  sum  formula  to  express  (1)  without  summations,  we 
have: 
The yields  to  maturity,  i  and  r,  are for  bonds  that are identical in  all 
respects except for  the likelihood  of  default.  Further  simplifications of  the 
above expression are possible,  if  one approximates the finite-maturity coupon 
bond  with a perpetuity, and if  one assumes that default results in  a  total loss 
to debt holders. 2 
A  more  general  specification  of  equation  (I) would  involve  time-sub- 
scripts  for  the variable  P,  so that  payment  rates would  be allowed  to vary 
over  calendar  time (hence  the term structure).  The product of  the PIS from 
t  the initial date to the relevant  payment dates would  replace P  in  the first 
term in  the numerators of  the left hand  side of  (1).  The  product of  the P's 
from the initial date to the date preceeding the payment date would  be multi- 
plied  by  1 minus  the expected  payment  rate in  the relevant  period  for  the 
second term.  Of  course,  there is no  way to  identify the values of  the separ- 
ate  expected  probabilities  of  payments.  In  addition,  a  closed-form  solution 
like  that of  equation  (2)  could  not  be found.  The use  of  a  single,  constant 
measure of  P  can be interpreted as an "average"  likelihood  of  payment, sum- 
marizing expectations of  future payment rates. 
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An  index  of  yields  to  maturity  for  low-rated  bonds  was  obtained  from 
Salomon  Brothers
1  Corporate  Bond  Research  department.  The  index  used  be- 
gins at  the end of  1979 and is constructed from a  sample of  176 bonds (as of 
September  19851,  weighted  by  the outstanding  principal amount of  each issue 
(to control for each issue's  relative influence on  market  rates) that meet  the 
following  criteria:  1)  more  than $25  million  in  principal  outstanding (assuring 
adequate  marketability),  2)  ratings  below  Baa31BBB-,  or  not  rated  but  of 
lower  than  Baa31BBB-  quality,  3)  a  coupon  of  10  percent or  more,  and  4) 
longer  than  10  years  in  maturity.)  In  addition,  we were able  to obtain  the 
weighted  coupon  rates and  weighted  maturity  date for  the sample at  each- 
point  in  time.  Defaulting  bonds  are removed  from  the sample,  as  are issues 
that are upgraded  to investment-grade status. 
Complications arise in  the analysis because of  several uncontrolled  fac- 
tors.  First,  nearly  all corporate bonds contain call provisions.  In  a  sample of 
702  currently  outstanding,  publicly  held,  low-rated  (or  nonrated)  issues,  all 
but  32 had  call provisions,  and 97  were being called as  of  January 1986.  In 
practice,  many  (high-coupon)  low-rated  bonds  trade on a  yield-to-call basis. 
Of  course,  high-grade  corporate  bonds  also  carry  call  provisions.  The  fact 
that the low-rated sample consists of  high-coupon issues,  increases the likeli- 
hood  that they  would  be called if  interest  rates fall significantly (or if  the 
f irmls  financial  condition  warrants  an  up-grading).  This  and  other  factors 
imply  that there is  no  comparable  high-grade  index  that will  exactly  match 
each of  the characteristics (apart from default risk) of  the low-rated sample. 
As a  compromise,  we chose to  use Salomon  Brothers'  New  Medium  Term 
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Yields and  Yield Spreads.  This series is  based on estimates (by  Salomon's Syn- 
dicate Department) of  the required  yields on  issues coming to market that are 
rated  Aaa  and  will  mature  in  10  years.  These  estimates were  made  at the 
beginning  of  month  t+l and  were  aligned  with  the  low-rated  index  obser- 
vations that were taken on the last day of  month  t. 
It has been observed  that new issues are priced at  yields slightly  higher 
than t'seasoned"  issues,  due to their  relative lack of  liquidity.  The  Aaa/AAA 
rated yields  were chosen  to represent the default-risk-free rates largely  be- 
cause of  the lack of  defaults by  bonds originally issued  with this rating in  the 
past  15  years.  Using  the  yields  on  long-term  U.S.  Treasury  issues  as  the 
default-free yield would complicate the analysis,  because these securities lack-. 
call  provisions,  and  because  their  returns are subject  to different tax treat- 
ment.  In  addition,  the sheer  volume  of  transactions involving Treasury  bonds 
introduces  the  possibility  that  yield  differentials  reflect  a  marketability 
factor.  4 
Finally, cross-sectional variations in  the measured returns of  a sample of 
representative  bonds  can  be attributed  to firm-specific  idiosyncrasies.  It  is 
assumed  that  the average measured  returns  will  vary  systematically  as the 
result of  a  factor that is  tied to the default experience of  corporate bonds. 
The  use  of  a  weighted  average of  bond  returns  causes  the influence of  the 
idiosyncratic variations to cancel one another.  Hickman  (1958,  p.66)  discusses 
the difficulties of  using (weighted) average returns as  measures of  the return 
on  a  pooled  investment  portfolio.  He  concludes  that  under  most  conditions, 
the error will be negligible. 
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A  numeric  solution  program  was employed  to solve  (2) for the expected 
"payment  rate",  P,  given  supplied  values for  r,  I,  p,  C,  and  N,  at  the end of 
each  month  t.  This  is a  measure  of  the  cross-sectional  average  of  ~mplied 
expected  payment  rates,  based on  the yields of  a  cross-section of  low-rated 
bonds.  A  problem  emerges,  however,  because  of  the aggregation  procedures 
used. 
Let us assume  that P  is an implicit function of  r  (with i,  C,  p, and  N  held 
fixed).  Since (2) cannot be solved  explicitly for P,  a  computer simulation  was 
employed  to graph  the implicit function with  restrictions on the values of  the 
other  variables and  an assumption  about  the relationship  between  C  and  r. 
Figure  2  is a  graph  of  the simulation.  Note  that when  the payment  rate P  is' 
equal to 1,  the risky  rate takes on  the supplied  value of  the riskless rate (10 
percent here).  The relationship  between P and r  is shown to be convex in  the 
relevant range.  Jensenls inequality,  therefore, suggests that the cross-section- 
al average of  P  will  be greater than, or equal to,  the measured payment rate. 
This  implies  that our estimate of  (I-PI,  the implied  expected default rate, is 
biased downwards. 
A  plot of  (I-PI,  the expected default rate implied by our model of  yield 
differentials, is  presented in figure 3 along with a plot of  the moving average 
default series.  The fact that the implied expected default rate series appears 
to  track,  and  even  lead,  ltactualll default  rates so  well  is surprising,  given 
that the implied  rate represents an average of  expected future default rates. 
This  behavior  indicates a  degree of  myopia  on  the part  of  market  partici- 
pants.  The spread  between implied and actual (smoothed) default rates is also 
surprisingly  large and persistent over this period. 
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tion  of  these  variables,  one  may  gain  additional  insight  by  using  regression 
techniques.  Cochrane-Orcutt  adjusted  regressions  of  (1-P)  on  constants  and 
the "raw
tt  default rate series,  ADR,  as well  as the smoothed default  rate se- 
ries,  SADR,  are presented  below  in  table  2.  These  regressions  indicate  that 
there  is  some  connection  between  measured  implied  default  rates (based  on 
risk-neutral preferences) and the two actual default rate series.  The adjusted 
R-squares  of  10.2  percent and  11.1  percent,  respectively,  indicate  the per- 
centage variation in  the implied  default rate series that is "explained" by  the 
two measures of  actual default  rates.  The large t-statistics for  the constant 
terms cause  us  to  reject  the null  hypothesis  that the market's  (risk-neutral) 
estimate  of  default  rates  equals  actual  default  rate  experience.  In  fact,'. 
evidence suggests that  market  prices imply  default  rates that exceed  actual 
default rates by  roughly 5 percentage points. 
IV.  Default Experience, Holding  Period Yields, and Ex-post  Performance 
In  this  section,  we  apply  the  default-risk-neutral  framework  to  the 
pricing  of  risky  debt  in  terms  of  the  expected  holding  period  yields  on 
default-prone and default-free bonds.  A  bond's  holding period return embodies 
changes  in  the market  price as  well  as  coupon  earnings (pro-rated  for  the 
holding  period).  Define  Bt  to be the default-free bond's  market  price at  the 
end of  period  t, and Ct to be the promised coupon payment earned in period 
t.  Now  let the holding  period  return  for a  default-risk-free bond  be defined 
by  Ht,  such that: 
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price Bli and coupon Cli in  period i  is represented by: 
Note that H  and h  are period-specific returns,  in turn, convertible to annual  t  t 
rates. 
Now  let mt  be the percieved  probability  that an issuer  will  not default 
over  period  t,  conditional  upon  a  default not  having  previously  occurred.  If 
the period  under  consideration is a single month,  then (mt)12  is the expected 
likelihood that the firm will not default over a given year. 
Let us further assume  that in the event of  a default,  the holder of  the 
risky  bond  will  receive with  certainty a  fraction  p  of  the beginning  period 
price B*t-l.  The investor's expected (net of  default) return on the risky bond, 
E(ht),  is therefore given by: 
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case  of  certain  default,  E(h  )  will  equal  (p-l),  resulting  in  a  loss  to  the  t 
bondholder.  In  the absence  of  market  imperfections,  equilibrium  in  the risk- 
neutral  setting  requires  that  the  expected  net-of-default  return  on  the 
default-prone and  the default-free bond  will  be equal.  Setting  the right-hand 
side of  (5) equal to Ht  and using equation (4),  we have: 
Subtracting both sides of  (6) from ht  and rearranging, gives: 
where  (I-mt)  is  the  period-specific  expected  default  rate embodied  in  the 
holding  period  yields  of  the default-prone  and  default-free  securities,  given 
an assumed  recovery  rate,  pO5 Note that (7)  represents a  risk-neutral, ex ante 
relationship  between  expected  holding  period  returns  and  expected  default 
rates. 
A  bond's  realized holding  period  return,  however,  is an ex post measure 
of  performance.  Conversely,  measured  yields-to-maturity are based  on expec- 
ted  performance  and  embody  ex ante expected  default  rates.  Bond  holding 
period  returns  may  deviate  from  expected  returns,  limiting  our  ability  to 
measure  implied  default  rates from  the difference  between  holding  period 
yields of  risky and risk-f ree bonds. 
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Ceteris  paribus,  this  would  have  the effect  of  reducing  the prices  of  out- 
standing low-rated bonds,  thereby reducing the measured  holding period  return 
h . IJnder  most  conditions,  this would  lower the "implied" default rate (1-mt). 6  t 
Indeed,  below  we  show  that  relatively  short-run  price  movements  (resulting 
from  new default information) can cause the r~ght-hand  side of  (7) to take on 
negative  values,  thereby  violating  the definition of  a  probability.  Therefore, 
(7)  cannot  be  used  to obtain  implied  default  rates.  What  one  obtains from 
applying  this formula  to ex post  returns is a  differential "performance rate" 
for low-rated bonds. 
A.  Holding  Period Data. 
A  proxy for ht  was constructed monthly by Blume and Keim (1984) based 
on  the price movements and  coupon  payments of  the bonds  used  in  Salomon 
Brother's  Low-Rated  (or  High  Yield)  Bond  Index  (discussed  above).  The 
"merged1'  series starts at  the end of  January  1980 and  covers  through  June 
1984.  It  has a  mean  of  1.14  percent (for an equivalent annual average return 
of  14.57  percent) and a standard deviation of  4.09  percent.  7 
As a  measure of  the holding period  returns on default-free bonds,  Ht,  we 
used  Salomon  Brother's  High  Grade Index  for  total  rate-of-return  found  in 
their  Analytical  Record of  Yields and  Yield  Spreads (up to  December  1985). 
The index  was formed  by  calculating  the total returns of  roughly  900 issues 
with  weights based  on issue size.  The weights are revised  monthly,  and bond 
issues are included and deleted as  ratings are updated.  The average weighted 
maturity of  the issues at  the end of  1985 was 22.1  years.  This series is also 
used as a benchmark return in Blume and Keim (1984). 
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In  order  to  minimize  extraneous  influences  on  holding  period  yields,  a 
holding  period of  one year was selected, in  addition to the one-month  holding 
period.  The  Blume-Keim  series was  converted  to an  annual  return series  by 
accumulating monthly  returns over  the past  year at each  month.  That is,  the 
measured annual holding  period  return at each date is based on  the returns to 
bond  holders  who  sold  a  security  purchased one  year  earlier  (and  collected 
coupon  payments  for  the period).  With  these measures of  return,  (7)  implies 
that annual performance rates are estimated. 
In  figure  4,  we present a  plot of  the performance rate implied  by  equa- 
tion (7),  obtained from annual holding period measures, along with the historic 
moving  average default  rate,  SADRt.  Confirming  our intuition,  negative per- 
formance  rates exist  when  actual default experience is  highest.  The  perfor- 
mance  rate,  (I-mt),  reaches a  minimum  value of -0.1009  in  November  1982, 
the  month  following  the  maximum  value  reached  by  the  smoothed  actual 
default rate series.  It is clear that periods corresponding to negative perfor- 
mance rates are those in  which one-year holders of  low-rated bonds  realized 
significant  losses.  In  general,  the performance rate series descends as actual 
default rates rise,  and vice-versa. 
In  table 2,  we present the regressions of  the measured performance rates 
(expressed  in  annual  terms  and  based  on  one- and  12-month  holding  period 
yields) on the two actual default rate series.  The low R-squares indicate that 
relatively  little of  the variation  in performance rates is  explained  by  actual 
default rates.  The negative coefficients on actual default  rates and the sig- 
nificant t-statistic on  the smoothed  default rate series supports the observa- 
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mance  of  low-rated  bonds.  The  significant  (and  positive)  t-statistics on  the 
constant  terms of  the  regressions,  using  a  performance  rate  series  formed 
from  12-month  holding period  yields suggest  that, on average, holders of  low- 
rated  bonds  realized  significant  holding  period  gains  relative to their  high- 
grade counterparts. 
V.  Default Expectations and Macroeconomic Measures 
In  this section,  an attempt is  made  to allow for  the influence of  other 
macroeconomic  variables,  in  addition  to actual  corporate default  rates,  on 
implied  default  and  performance  rates.  Past  studies  of  differential  quality 
spreads  have used  an assortment of  macroeconomic  indicators.  Jaffee (1975) 
examines factors that influence the risk spread of  corporate yields in a cycli- 
cal fashion.  He  finds  that the most  significant  variable in  explaining the risk 
spread  is a  measure  constructed by  Fair  (19711,  based  on data collected  by 
the University of  Michigan Survey Research Center, which acts as a proxy for 
consumer  sentiment.  This  factor  was  also  used  by  Cook  and  Hendershott 
(19781,  in addition to others,  to explain the spread between high-grade corpo- 
rate and Treasury  securities.  Rather than  take this approach,  implied  default 
and  performance rates are tested for correlation  with  new default  informa- 
tion and surprises in  macroeconomic measures. 
It  is well  known  that in  periods of  (unanticipated)  rising  prices,  firms 
with fixed nominal contractual obligations tend to benefit.  Conversely,  (unan- 
ticipated) reductions in prices may  cause hardship to some firms.  Since expec- 
ted inflation  will  already be incorporated into the contracts, it is  the unan- 
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fore,  a  natural  macroeconomic  proxy  is  the  deviation  of  the  percentage 
change  in  the  consumer  price  level  from  expectations.  Other  indicators  of 
macroeconomic activity are the Board of  Governors of  the Federal  Reserve's 
industrial  production  index  and  the  Labor  Department's  unemployment  rate 
estimate. 
Two characteristics of  our sample period  tend to limit  the effectiveness 
of  this  exercise,  however.  The  first  is  the  relatively  short  sample  period 
available to us.  The size of  the market for low-rated bonds approached signif- 
icance only  towards the end of  the 1970s.  The identification of  long-run  rela- 
tionships  is,  thus,  seriously  hampered.  Secondly,  in  the sample period  of  this 
study,  the overall  inflation  rate was,  on average, falling,  after a  long  period 
of  accelerating inflation.  The effects of  this regime switch  on  the reported 
results  is  indeterminate,  introducing  the  possibility  that  the  behavior  of 
market  participants over a  longer  period  may  well  differ  from  the behavior 
exhibited here. 
To test for a  relationship between unanticipated  inflation rates and our 
estimates of  implied default and performance rates, we constructed an unanti- 
cipated inflation series by  subtracting one-month-ahead  forecasts of  the per- 
centage  change  in  the  CPI  (obtained  from  Money  Market  Services)  from 
actual  monthly  percentage  changes.  Similar  series  were  constructed  for 
measures of  the unemployment  rate and  the percentage change in  industrial 
production  (a  monthly  proxy  for  GNP).  One  would  expect  that,  if  agents 
incorporate  new information  about  the economy (in  addition  to firm-specific 
factors) into their expectations of  default rates, these proxies will be related 
to changes in expected default rates. 
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default  rates,  obtained  from  differential  yields  to  maturity  (I-P),  on  a  con- 
stant,  actual default  rates (in  levels  as well  as  first  differences),  unantici- 
pated  inflation,  unanticipated  industrial  production,  and  unanticipated  unem- 
ployment.  The macroeconomic  surprises were lagged one month,  as the tirning 
of  the actual  series normally  lags  the  reported  period  by  a  few  weeks.  The 
results, found in  table 3,  indicate that of the three macroeconomic indicators, 
surprises in  reported measures of  industrial production have the highest corre- 
lation  with  implied  expected  default  rates,  although  the  level  of  actual 
default rates contributes slightly  more.  When  the first differences of  actual 
default  rates are used,  the surprise in  inflation  appears to have the highest 
(negative)  correlation  with  expected  default  rates.  However,  no  variable 
enters significantly  in  either  regression  at  the 95  percent  confidence  level. 
The low  adjusted R-squares also leads us  to conclude that current macroeco- 
nomic surprises are poor indicators of  expected default rates. 
The same regressions,  adjusted for serial correlation of  the error terms, 
were run using  the implied performance rate (based on one-month holding per- 
iod yields,  converted to annual rates) in place of  expected default rates.  Also 
found  in  table 3,  these results  suggest  that,  though  insignificant at  the 95 
percent confidence level,  surprises in  inflation are most closely related (posi- 
tively)  to performance  rates.  It  must  be the case  that firm-specific  factors 
dominate  the formation of  default expectations to the point  that surprises  in 
macroeconomic measures are poor predictors of  overall quality spreads. 
VI.  Summary  & Conclusions 
This  paper  represents  the first effort  to tie  together  the. differential 
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fault experience of  these issues.  A  model  of  the behavior  of  low-rated  bond 
pricing  was developed  in  a  risk-neutral  setting.  We applied  the model  to the 
observed  returns of  a  sample of  bonds and compared  the default rates implied 
in  these  returns  to  the  default experience  of  low-rated  debt.  We conclude 
that  the default  rates implied  in  corporate bond  returns exceed those exper- 
ienced in  recent years.  In  this sense,  holders of  well-diversified  portfolios of 
low-rated corporate bonds  are rewarded for bearing default risks.  It  was also 
shown  that measured  holding  period  returns cannot be used to extract implied 
default rates. 
Finally,  we examined  the relationship  between a  set of  macroeconomic 
variables and  expected  measures of  default  and  performance  rates.  We con- 
clude  that  expected  corporate default  rates are not  related  to any  of  the 
macroeconomic  variables  at  the 5  percent  critical  level,  although  expected 
default  rates were most strongly related to surprises in inflation measures and 
actual default rates.  Surprises in  output proxies appear to have less of  a rela- 
tionship to expected default rates. 
Further study  in this area will  require the accumulation  of  better (and 
more  detailed)  measures  of  corporate  bond  returns.  The  construction  of  a 
standardized  data base,  modeled  after the Center for  Research  on Security 
Prices (or CRISP) tapes,  would most benefit future endeavors in  this field.  In 
addition, a  longer sample period would increase our understanding of  both  the 
pricing  of  default  risk  and  the relationship  between  expected  default  rates 
and macroeconomic activity. 
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1.  Yawitz,  Maloney,  and  Ederington (1983) do not compare  their estimates of 
default rates in  the municipal  market with actual rates. 
2.  If  one approximates  the finite-maturity  coupon  bond  with  a  perpetuity-- 
multiply  the left-hand side of  (2) by  (~+i)-~/(l+i)'~  and the right hand side by 
(~+r)-~/(l+r)-~  and let N  approach infinity--then (2) becomes: 
If  we assume  that default  results in a  total loss  to holders  (pol,  then  this 
becomes: 
3.  For the 176 issues in Salomon Brother's  Low-Rated Index,  as of  September 
1985,  23 were rated  BB  (by  Standard  &  Poor's),  26  were rated B+,  34  were 
rated  B,  45  were  rated  B-,  and  48  were rated  CCC.  AdtN  find  that  the 
highest  default-risk group (in  terms of  rating at  issuance) were bonds  rated 
single 0.  This index,  therefore, represents the average returns of  the riskiest 
corporate bonds. 
4.  Coupon  payments  received  from Treasury  securities  are currently exempt 
from state and local income taxes.  Ibbotson and Sinquefieldls (1982) measured 
default  premium,  constructed  by  subtracting  the ex-post  holding  returns on 
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Best available copyTreasury  bonds from AAA/Aaa  rated  corporates,  may  mostly  reflect  this  tax 
differential. 
5.  As  in  footnote  2,  the  assumption  that  default  results  in  a  total  loss  to 
bondholders  (that is,  p=0) gives: 
6.  The  partial derivative of  (1-mt)  with  respect to ht  is: 
2  {Ht  + (l-p)IAht  +  (1-p#  , 
and  will  be  positive  when  Ht>(p-1).  The  smallest  value  reached  by  the one- 
month  holding  period  return  on  the  high-grade  series  from  January  1980 
through  June 1984  is -0.0799.  The  12-month  holding  period  minimum  for  this 
rate is -0.1296.  Based  on  Altmants estimates, (p-1)  equals -0.59,  implying  that 
this condition will be met  under  most circumstances. 
7.  See Blume and  Keim (1984) for a description of  this series. 
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Best available copyTable 1  Summary  of  Measured and Constructed Series 
Mean  Standard deviation  Minimum  Maximum 
(date)  (date) 
12/79 through 12/85 




ADR  .  0.0 1776 
(12-month) 
1/80 through 6/84 
12/80 through 6/84 
(1  -m)  0.08858 
(fr.  12-month  HPY) 
t Expressed as an annual rate. 
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Best available copyTable 2  Implied  Default  and  Performance  Rates on  Actual and Smoothed 
Default  Rates 
Dependent variable  Const.  ADR  SADR  R~  DW 
(I-m) 
(fr.  I-month HPY) 
(1-m) 
(fr. 12-month  HPY) 
(I-m) 
(fr. 12 month  HPY) 
Note:  All  regressions  were  run  using  the  Cochrane-Orcutt  procedure  for 
first-order  serial correlation.  The  reported  Durbin-Watson  statistics are less 
powerful  when  the  serial  adjustment  technique  is  used.  The  t-statistics  are 
reported in parentheses. 
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Best available copyTable 3  Implied  Default and  Performance Rates on Actual Default Rates and 
Macroeconomic Surprises 
(Dependent  Variable First-Differenced) 
Dependent  Const.  ADR  Infl.  1nd.Prod.  Unemp.  K'  DW 
variable 
(Dependent  Variable and ADR  First-Differenced) 
*-. . 
t  Run  using  the Cochrane-Orcutt  procedure for first-order serial correlation. 
The t-statistics are reported in parentheses. 
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Best available copyFigure  1:  Actual Default Rate Series (in  Annual  Rates). 
Source:  Altman and  Nammacher  (1985),  and  Standard & Poor's Bond  Guide. 
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Best available copyFigure  2:  Plot of  r  against  P (with p=.41,  i=.l,  C=.913rt,  and  N=14). 
t: The  partial adjustment  for coupon  rates is based  on  the  fact that  corporate 
bonds  were trading, on  average, at 91.3 percent of  par  value. 
Source:  See text. 
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Best available copyFigure 3:  Time Series of  (1-P)  and Smoothed Actual Default Rates. 
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